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Abstract
The economic and political reforms begun in the United States during the 1930s and expanded during the
1960s and early 1970s represented a significant change in the relationship between government and citizens,
shifting the boundary between public and private spheres of influence. Much of this expanded government
was harnessed to benefit previously powerless groups, often in ways that violated the tenets of classical liberal
democracy and free market capitalism. To some degree, this expansion of the state was accompanied by a
parallel shift in the terms of public discourse (consider, for example, the imagery contained in a phrase like
'The Great Society'). In general, however, essentially socialist policies were justified using the rhetoric of
liberalism: political reforms were defended in terms of individual rights, and economic reforms in terms of
equal opportunity. Indeed, some have argued that the reforms of the 1930s and the 1960s were designed to
prevent a more conscious and comprehensive embrace of democratic socialism.
The creation of a limited welfare state led to tangible gains for America's politically and economically
disadvantaged classes. However, the failure openly to address the relationship among the often competing
values of democracy, capitalism and socialism, coupled with the incremental, piecemeal nature of the reforms
themselves, resulted in a double bind. Grafted on to essentially unchanged political and economic institutions,
processes and values, the reforms were incapable of producing the 'Great Society' that was promised. By the
late 1970s these limits were clear. Against the backdrop of 'stagflation', political and economic justice could no
longer be sold as costless. No longer assured of the expanding economic pie that helped mask both the limits
and the costs of many federal programmes, America needed to confront its half century ménage à trois with
democratic capitalism and democratic socialism. However, the failure to develop a coherent justification for
the socialist reforms of the past 50 years meant there was no 'public language' with which directly to defend
them, let alone to advocate for more comprehensive change.
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T he economic and political reforms begun in the United Statesduring the 1930s and expanded during the 1960s and early 1970s
represented a significant change in the relationship between government
and citizens, shifting the boundary between public and private spheres
of influence. Much of this expanded government was harnessed to
benefit previously powerless groups, often in ways that violated the
tenets of classical liberal democracy and free market capitalism. To some
degree, this expansion of the state was accompanied by a parallel shift
in the terms of public discourse (consider, for example, the imagexy
contained in a phrase like The Great Society'). In general, however,
essentially socialist policies were justified using the rhetoric of liberalism:
political reforms were defended in terms of individual rights, and eco-
nomic reforms in terms of equal opportunity.! Indeed, some have argued
that the reforms of the 1930s and the 1960s were designed to prevent a
more conscious and comprehensive embrace of democratic socialism.2
The creation of a limited welfare state led to tangible gains for Ameri-
ca's politically and economically disadvantaged classes. However, the fail-
ure openly to address the relationship among the often competing values
of democracy, capitalism and socialism, coupled with the incremental,
piecemeal nature of the reforms themselves, resulted in a double bind.
Grafted on to essentially unchanged political and economic institutions,
processes and values, the reforms were incapable of producing the 'Great
Society' that was promised. By the late 1970s these limits were clear.
Against the backdrop of 'stagflation', political and economic justice could
no longer be sold as costless. No longer assured of the expanding eco-
nomic pie that helped mask both the limits and the costs of many federal
programmes, America needed to confront its half centwy .nenage a trois
with democratic capitalismand democratic socialism. However, the failure
to develop a coherent justification for the socialist reforms of the past 50
years meant there was no 'public language' with which directly to defend
them, let alone to advocate for more comprehensivechange.
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It was in this context that the elections of 1980, 1984 and 198.8
took place. While political obselVers rightly lament the lack of substance
in the American campaign process, an examination of these three presi-
dential elections reveals a wealth of information that is, ironically, more
useful today than it was during the campaigns themselves. Contained
within the rhetoric and polispots are argunients and images that address,
even if as parable, the major issues of the last half of the twentieth
century. In essence these elections selVed as a series of referenda oli the
'Old Left' politics of the 1930s and the 'New Left' politics of the 1960s
and early 1970s.
For the reasons noted above, however, these referenda took place
within a narrow ideological space that greatly handicapped attempts to
defend the legacy of America's domesticated version of democratic
socialism. For both the truly disadvantaged and the truly advantaged,
these elections were fmnly tied to material interests, a fact that is
generally reflected in their voting behaviour during the 1980s. However.
for working- and lower-middle-class citizens, teetering between the haves
and the have nots, 'self interest properly understood' 3 is arrived at less
easily. It is in appealing to this segment of the US electorate that the
absence of a language with which adequately to present and defend a
progressive agenda was most sorely felt.
Thus, when America addressed issues of race, class, gender,
militarism and, ultimately. ideology in the 1980s, it was the right that
set the terms of political discourse. Rather than presenting a coherent
alternative to the vision of the past, present, and future conjured up by
the Republicans, Democrats, for the most part, accepted these terms.
And given that the political right and left in America are defmed by the
rhetoric of these two parties, the impact of this concession was to
shrink 'the sphere of legitimate controversy',4 while at' the same time
shifting the political centre to the right. That this should happen at an
historical moment when the American left needed to expand public
discourse on these issues has consequences that go well beyond which
party controlled the presidency during the 1980s.
The Democratic victotyin 1992 would seem to mark a shift of
momentum. back to a more progressive political agenda. In some impor-
tant ways this is true. However, this shift in fortunes took place within a
public sphere that had been dramatically altered by twelve years of con-
selVative rhetoric. Viewed relative to the elections of 1980, 1984 and
. 1988, the election of 1992 represents a victory for the left in America.
Viewed from a broader perspective, however, the victory rings more
hollow. The late 19808 and early 1990s offered a unique opportunity to
redefme the terms of political discourse in the United States. While it
would be overly pessimistic to say that this opportunity has been lost, the
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1992 election is at best a small step fonvard after three vety large steps
back.
In this chapter I explore the ways race, class, gend~r, foreign policy
and ideology were defmed during the 1980s. In doing so I try to
connect that rhetoric to the voting behaviour of the American· public
and to the tangible gains and losses made by different segments of that
public. My argument is that by controlling the terms of discourse,
Republicans were able to construct a consensual majority, and thus to
tum back many - though not all - of the gains made over the prior
several decades. This conselVative victoty resulted in part from condi-
tions specific to the 1980s, but ultimately represent the limits to
political reforms that do not consciously address the underlying tension
between the ideologies of liberal capitalism and economic democracy.
Jesse Jackson, Willie Horton and Race in America
Racial inequality has been an issue in American politics since a Dutch
merchant sold a Virginia tobacco farmer 'twenty negars' in 1619.5
Despite this constancy, issues of race have only periodically affIXed
themselves to the national political agenda. The late 1950s and early
1960s constituted such a period. The combination of an organized civil
rights movement and a spontaneous revolt in the nation's inner cities led
the courts, Congress and the Executive Branch to address issues of
segregation, as well as of political and economic inequities .between
whites and blacks.
While the government's response might legitimately be described as
too little too late, real gains were made. Between 1965 and 1975 the
black infant mortality rate declined from 40.3 to 24.2 deaths per 1000
births.6 Declines in the percentage of blacks living in substandard or
overcrowded housing, begun in the 1940s, accelerated through the
1960s. The percentage of blacks living below the poverty line declined
from 55 per cent in 1959 to 33 per cent in 1970. The .median family
income of blacks, 55 per cent that of white families in 1955, rose
slightly to 60 per cent by 1971. In 1960, the average black 25 to 29
year old had completed 2.4 years less education than his or her white
counterpart; by 1970 the difference had shrunk to 0.5 years. By 1970,
1977 of the 2702 school districts in the South had been desegregated.
The percentage of Southern blacks registered to vote nearly tripled from
1955 to 1968, with black turnout following a siniilar if less dramatic
increase. Largely as a result of these changes (and other federally
mandated changes in state electoral laws), the number of blacks elected
to government more than tripled during the 1960s and 1970s.
None of the statistics presented above suggests that America had
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successfully dealt with its de jure or de facto racial problems in tb:e
1960s and 1970s. Blacks remained significantly less well off econonu-
cally and politically, and were discriminated against in a variety of ways.
As the beginning of a national effort to address racial inequality,this
period held great promise. In retrospect, however, these improvements
represent not a still-rising tide, but a highwater mark. For all the
measures presented above, blacks are either no better off today, or are
worse off, than they were 15 years ago. An 18-year-old black male in
1993 is more likely to be in jail than in college.
What accounts for this backslide? The declining economy of the late
1970s and early 19805 certainly led to a more fIScally conselVative
mind-set, yet this does not explain the exclusion of most blacks from
the economic recovery of the last three-quarters of the 1980s.7 An
alternative explanation is found in the attitude among much of white
middle America that enough had been done to 'level the playing field'. In
its most extreme form, this view often devolved into a belief that blacks
had become politically and economically advantaged vis-a-vis whites. This
is not an inevitable conclusion for whites to have drawn, however.
Public opinion data suggests that whites hold mixed, often contradictory
views concerning race and civil rights in America. The dominance of
conselVative, even racist beliefs in the 1980s resulted in part from the
ability of the Republican Party to exploit these beliefs, especially among
whites most directly threatened by the economic and political gains
made by blacks. This, coupled with the failure of mainstream proponents
of civil rights to defend past reforms, led to a gradual shifting of public
discourse on race during the 1980s. And with it came a shift in electoral
support.
White electoral support for the Democratic Party's social agenda
has always been tenuous: since Franklin Roosevelt, only one president
has received a majority of the white vote in presidential elections.
Significantly, however, this one president was Lyndon Johnson, a
relatively vocal proponent of civil rights reforms in the 1960s. In the
political environment of the 1960s, the Democratic Party's stand on
race was in the mainstream. By the 1980s, however, this was no
longer the case. In the 1980 and 1984 .pr~sidential elections, only
slightly more than one in three whites voted Democratic.8 This 'white
flight' meant that blacks, once a pivotal group in the Democratic
Party's presidential coalition, were no longer able to swing elections.
In tum, issues of race were even less likely than usual to· become part
of the national agenda. Indeed, one of the legacies of Ronald Reagan
,vas to make issues of race a political liability.
In one of the most effective examples of 1980s 'newspeak'Reagan
and his campaigD. strategists succeeded in defming groups· that argued
236 AN AMERICAN HALP-C ENTURY
or organized on the basis of race (as well as of class, gender and
sexual preference) as 'special interests'. As a result, in the 1980 and
1984 presidential campaigns, race was very much a non-issue. The few
attempts made by Democrats to challenge this (for example, when
President Carter questioned the motives behind Reagan's launching his
1980 campaign in the deep South) backfired under charges of 'reverse
discrimination'. Significantly, the most widely covered racial issue in
the 1980 presidential campaign was an anti-semitic remark made by
Jesse Jackson during the primaries.
This return of race to the realm of invisible politics characterized
the Reagan years. Of course, when prominent elites (for example,
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz) were caught making racial slurs,
they were publicly punished. But rather than demonstrating the depth
of racial stereotypes, these incidents (and public reaction to them)
were interpreted as evidence that the United States was beyond the
era of racial politics. The term 'discrimination' itself lost its unstated
prepositional phrase 'of blacks by whites', and instead came to mean
a'IY discrimination. This, in tum, often meant the 'discrimination' of
racial quotas, special hiring practices and other attempts to redress
over 350 years of racial inequity. Of course, racial issues continued to
be addressed periodically, most often in response to particularly brutal
examples of racism, which, not coincidentally, were on the rise in the
19805. As often as not, however, when racial issues emerged, they
were presented by political elites and in the mainstream media as
aberrations. or as the last vestiges of an outmoded attitude. The only
open discussion of stmctural racism to occur during the Reagan years
focused not on domestic politics. but on South Mrican apartheid.
By the late 1980s, the combination of black economic distress and
increasing racial conflict forced race back on to the national agenda. The
context of this renewed attention was very different than in the 1950s
and 1960s, however. As Carey McWilliams notes, by the 1980s 'legal
segregation [was] a hazy memory, and ... in the media ... and hence in
the view of most Americans - race [was] visible largely in relation to
crime and the sleazier forms of interest group politics.' 9
Even news stories about white racism subtly devolved into stories
about black racism. For example, in the late 1980s racial inequality,
racially motivated attacks on blacks, and allegations of police brutality
led local grassroots groups to organize several visible, often confronta-
tional demonstrations in New York City. In ways ·reminiscent of media
coverage of the anti-war movement of the 1960s,10 the central story
soon shifted from racial inequality to the more flamboyant, inflammatory
behaviour of some black grassroots leaders. In the end, the motives and
tactics of a few black leaders were used to discredit what was a very
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diverse black movement with a host of legitimate grievances.
It was in this context that the 1988 presidential campaign took
place. Race was no longer invisible, but neither was it a major compo-
nent of either party's political rhetoric. Instead, it selVed as a .thinly
veiled subtext to other political and social issues. The Democratic
Party's (and so liberal America's) constrained discourse on race is best
exemplified by the rise and fall of Jesse Jackson's primary campaign.
Jackson fmished second in the primaries, garnering 29 per cent of the
vote to Michael Dukakis's 43 per cent. Nonetheless, the only group· that
supported Jackson over Dukakis were blacks, who cast 92 per cent of
their votes for him.. In contrast, only 12 per cent of white primary
voters cast their ballots for Jackson. This racial split was not lost on the
media, who continually covered Jackson as a candidate who could not
win the Democratic nomination; a candidate who at best 'spoke' for
blacks and at worst might be a liability for whomever did get the
nomination. This split was also not lost on Dukakis, who subtly played
up the racial issue by calling himself ·the inevitable' Democratic nomi-
nee. Both the decision not to choose Jackson as Dukakis's running
mate, and to keep Jackson relatively invisible during the general election,
further illustrates how race had become a liability for Democrats in the
1980s.
While race was a liability for the Democrats, it was an issue to be
exploited by the Republicans. And exploit it they did. Bush spoke in the
code words of racial discrimination, as had Republican candidates since
Bany Goldwater, railing against crime, drugs and the liberal agenda. The
skilful use of television images left no doubt about what the real issue was,
however. In the infamous 'Willie Horton' campaign spot, viewers were
shown a picture of a glaring black man who, while on prison furlough, had
raped a white woman. Playing on the same racist stereotypes that fuelled
groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch society, this campaign ad
selVed as the lens through which campaign spots about crime and drup
were viewed, and with which seemingly neutral statements about these
issues were decoded. It is not that the racist (as well as the factually
misleading) elements of this ad were missed by the Democrats or the news
media, both of whom cried foul. Nor was it that the public was inundated
with the ad - it was only shown regionally·and for a few weeks of the
campaign. To the contrary, the effectiveness of the ad came from its
notoriety. By campaign's end, 60 per cent of the American public knew
about the Willy Horton ad and the controversy surrounding it. The ad's
power was in its ability to raise and defme the issue of race (and so elicit
racist sentiments) without Bush having to do so. And on election day
white America voted for Bush 60 per cent to 40 per cent, while black
Americavoted for Dukakis 86 per.cent to 12 per cent.
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The primaty and general elections of 1988 proved to be accurate
signposts for the direction racial politics would take in the late 1980s
and early 19905. Blacks continued to make some largely symbolic
inroads in electoral politics, with Jesse· Jackson winning the new House
seat representing the District of Columbia, David Dinkins winning the
mayoral race in New York City, and Douglas Wilder winning the
governorship in Virginia. All three \von by taking a majority of the black
vote \vhile losing a majority of the white vote, however. And all thlee,
along with other black leaders of mainly urban areas, were given the
helms of sinking ships, as the fmancial neglect of the 1980s took its toll.
This, in tUm, added to the perception that blacks, once elected, were
unable to govern effectively. The vigour with which federal officials and
the media publicly tried Marion Barry for his abuse of the public trust
in the District of Columbia, especially in comparison to the relatively
low proftle given the conupt behaviour of white Congressmen and
Senators in the much more significant savings and loan scandal, exempli.
fied the extent to which race continued to colour the way in which
seemingly non-racial issues were interpreted.
The state of non-white America outside the electoral arena has been
even less ambiguous. At this writing, poverty continues to plague people
of colour at three to four times the rate it affects whites. Approximately
half the black and Mexican-American female-headed households in the
United States live in poverty, as do almost three-quarters of female-
headed Puerto Rican families. Unemployment among blacks is four
times that of whites, and as many as half of young black males are
unable to fmd work. Poverty, unemployment and the resultant violent
crime are especially concentrated in the inner cities of the United
States, and so disproportionately fall on the shoulders of blacks and
Hispanics. Deteriorating social services, especially in urban areas, has
meant a rise in a variety of health problems: AIDS is significantly more
common among blacks than whites, and in some inner cities nineteenth-
century diseases like tuberculosis have approached epidemic proportions.
The abuse of drugs like alcohol, heroin and crack, co1D11ion if deadly
means of escape for the poor and destitute, also disproportionately
afflict blacks.
While the economic plight of blacks has reached crisis proportions,
federal, state and local aid that indirectly benefits blacks continued to
shrink during the Bush administration. Large, older cities were especially
hard hit by this decline, lacking the resources to -make up this lost
revenue through increases in personal taxes, and being held hostage by
companies that threatened to move if corporate taxes increased. Any
attempt to address problems of racial inequality directly came under
increasing attack from the White House. Under the rallying cries of
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'reverse discrimination' and 'quotas', George Bush vetoed a 1990 civil
rights bill designed to assure nondiscriminatory hiring practices. And the
Education Department's Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, in it
classic example of the new meaning of discrimination, ruled that scholar-
ships designed to recruit minorities to college violated the Civil Rights
Act prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race.
Lacking the language to defend government policy that is designed.to
give preferential treatment to blacks, and unwilling to pay the political
price necessary to create this language, the Democratic Party contrib-
uted to the shrinking public discourse on race. For example, when
reintroducing the civil rights legislation vetoed by Bush, Democrats
downplayed its racial significance, calling it a 'women's rights bill'.ll
And, in an effort to distance themselves from the bogey of 'quotas',
Democrats added language to the bill that explicitly banned the use of
quotas, and took to calling the legislation an 'anti-quota bill'. As a
result, rather than stimulating an open dialogue on race in the United
States, the debate over this legislation devolved into a public shouting
match over which party was Inore opposed to quotas.
Of course the great irony is that 'quotas' - in the worst sense of the
word - continued to be used, though in increasingly cynical ways. This
was dramatically illustrated by the nomination and eventual confmnation
of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court seat vacated by the great
champion of civil rights, Thurgood Marshall. Simply by nominating a
black to replace Marshall, President Bush paralysed many Democrats
into supporting Thomas, despite his less than stellar judicial record and
his public stands against affmnative action, abortion and a number of
other policies that had been part of the Democratic agenda during the
1960s and 1970s. While Thomas's nomination was in doubt, and while it
drew tremendous public attention, it was revelations of improper per-
sonal behaviour, not larger issues of constitutional law, that fuelled this
debate. Again we see the price paid by Democrats for not having fully
established the logic and ethic of these civil - and economic - rights
policies.
As government rhetoric closed off discussion of race in America,
street-level race relations have continued to deteriorate. Cities are
characterized by both de facto segregation and racial confrontation,
and bias-related incidents continue to rise. Similar patterns in race
relations are found on college and university campuses. With structural
.racism effectively dermed out of the white political agenda, issues
such as drug abuse and violent crime have become laden with racial
subtexts. The increasingly hf:lrdline approach to these social problems,
in which treatment and rehabilitation have given way to harsher
penalties and mo·re prisons, is at least partially motivated by white
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backlash. From the prosecution of teenage blacks, charged with raping
a white, female investment banker in New York City, to the prosecu-
tion of the black rap group, Two Live Crew, for' sexually explicit
lyrics, punishment of young black males has become a symbolic
spectator sport in contemporary America.
Many blacks, in an attempt to force their grievances on to the
political agenda, have turned to more provocative leaders, rhetoric and
action. Others, seeing little hope for consistent help from white
dominated institutions, have opted for an increasingly separatist 5trat-
egy.t2 However, seen through the lenses of the mainstream media,
and couched in the language of liberal democracy, these approaches
simply confum white America's suspicions that blacks in America are
misguided.
One fmal example illustrates the economic and political plight of
blacks during the early 1990s, and the extent to which, more than two
decades after the publication of the Kerner Report, the United States
remains 'two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal'.l3
In the midst of historic bailouts of the savings and loan and banking
industries, the black-owned 'Freedom Bank' of Harlem was allowed to
go out of business in 1990 without any federal assistance to the bank or
its depositors beyond what was stipulated by the Federal Depositors
Insurance Corporation. The federal government's decision was a fman-
cial one. If savings and loans in (white) Texas, or banks in. (white)
Connecticut fail, it could cause a panic that would spread throughout
(white) America. The failure of the (black) Freedom Bank would cause
no such ron on money. In short, black America in 1990 was sufficiently
separate and unequal that its fmancial problems would have no affect on
white America.
Bluebloods, Bluecollars, and the Construction of Class
America's 'war on poverty', declared by Lyndon Johnson in 1964, was
never very hard fought - by 1968 Johnson had turned his back on the
recommendations of the Kerner commission, feeling they were too
critical of his efforts to date. By 1968 he was also 'very much preoccu-
pied by a war of different sorts in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the 19605 and
1970s did show a tangible effort to address problems of poverty in the
USA. Between 1960 and 1979, the percentage of Americans living below
the poverty line declined from over 18 per cent to -under 7 per cent.14
Programmes such as Aid of Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
Food Stamps, Medicare and Medicaid also improved the condition of
America's poorest citizens. The percentage of poor people who had never
visited a doctor declined from 19 per cent in 1963 to 8 per cent in
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1970. The infant mortality rate among the poor fell by 33 per cent.(t;he
rate of decline was even greater for poor blacks). The percentage of
Americans living in substandard housing fell from 35 per cent in 1950
to 8 per cent in 1976. Participants in programmes such as the.Man-
power Development and Training Act (MDTA) and the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) had' lower levels of unemploy-
ment and earned higher wages than their untrained brothers and sisters.
Poor children who participated in project Head Start were 60 per cent
less likely to be assigned to special education classes, 45 per cent less
likely to be held back a grade, and scored several points higher on
standardized IQ tests than their classmates who did not participate in
the programme.
These modest inroads among the truly disadvantaged do not, of
course, indicate anything like economic equality in the United States.
Income distribution remained largely unaltered during this period, with
the richest 20 per cent of America's wage-earners controlling between
41 per cent and 44 per cent of the nation's yearly income, while the
poorest 20 per cent consistently brought home only 5 per cent of that
gross income. Nonetheless, some indications of a· changing distribution
of wealth existed. Perhaps most significantly, the percentage of wealth
controlled by America's richest half per cent declined from 25 per· cent
in 1965 to 14 per cent in 1976 - the lowest per cent recorded in the
twentieth century.
The election of Ronald Reagan marked a decided tum in America's
approach to the rich and poor. Running unabashedlyagainst the 'welfare
state', Reagan couched his class arguments in the language of populism,
the work ethic and-the trickle-down theory of the distribution of wealth.
Throughout the Reagan era critics charged that national economic and
social policy was a thinlyveiled effort to aid the rich at the expense of the
less well off. However, in the rhetorical environment of the 19805 these
arguments were unconvincing and fell, for the most part, on deaf ears.
Nonetheless, the evidence bears them out with u~elentingconsistency.
In 1980, the average salary for CEOs in the United States was 25
times what an average blue-collar worker earned - hardly evidence of
economic equality. By 1990, however, this ratio had jumped to almost
100 to 1. Between 1980 and 1988 the number of millionaires. decami1-
lionaires and centimillionaires in the United States tripled, while the
number of billionaires went from under ten to over 50. -·Between 1977
and 1988 only the richest 20 per cent of American families had incomes
that increased in constant dollar terms. Over this period the average
income of 80 per cent of American families declined in real terms by
over US$I,OOO, while the income of the wealthiest 10 per cent increased
by U5$16,913 (the increase for the richest 1 per cent was a staggering
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US$134,513 a year). By the mid-1980s the richest half per cent of
America saw their share of the national wealth jump back up to 27 per
cent - the greatest percentage since 1939. And while the rich got richer,
the poor got poorer. During the 1980s the overall poverty rate in the
United States returned to where it was prior to the War on Poverty,
while record numbers of the elderly, women and children entered the
ranks of the poor.
'Where a person's treasure is', said Congressman William Gray,
quoting from scripture, 'there you'll fmd his heart.' 15 The 1988 cam-
paign, pitting the blueblood lines of George Herbert Walker Bush
against Michael Dukakis's immigrant, blue-collar past, selVed both sym-
bolically and in real terms as a referendum on the Reagan philosophy,
unmasked from the disarming, bumbling style of 'the great communica-
tor'. It was also another referendum. on the now modified New DeaV
Great Society politics of the Democratic Party. The class element in this
campaign went beyond bloodlines. Bush's embrace of Reaganomics, his
emphasis on voluntarism (characterized by his theme of 'a thousand
points of light'), his pledge of no new taxes, and his support for a cut in
the capital gains tax, all clearly presented his vision of America to
America. And Dukakis's platform and rhetoric, while interspersed with
the language of managerial efficiency, and while toned down in response
to Bush's successful attacks on 'liberalism' (discussed below), was still
velJ' much in line with the New DeaVGreat Society rhetoric that .defmed
the Democratic coalition.
Significantly, in this referendum the Republican Party did less well
than it had in the 1984 presidential race, with Bush drawing 54 per cent
of the two party vote (compared to 59 per cent for Reagan in 1984) and
Dukakis drawing 46 per cent (compared to Mondale's 41 per cent).
Nonetheless, this election, even more than the 1980 or 1984 elections,
clearly demonstrated the split between rich and poor in the United
States. A list of the only demographic groups to give a majority of its
support to Dukakis reads like a litany of America's politically, socially,
and/or economically disadvantaged: blacks (86 per cent), "Hispanics (69
per cent), those eaming under US$10,OOOa year (64 per cent), Jews
(64 per cent), the unemployed (62 per cent), residents of large cities (58
per cent), unmarried \vomen (57 per cent), union households (57 per
cent), those without a high school diploma (56 per cent), those eaming
between US$10,OOO and U5$19,999 a year (53 per cent), teachers and
students (52 per cent), and blue-collar workers (51 per cent). At the
same time. Bush's strongest support came from white fundamentalists
(81 per cent) or white protestants more- generally (66 per cent), South-
ern whites (67 per cent), those eaming over US$40,OOO a year (62 per
cent). married men (60 per cent), professionals and managers (59 per
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cent), those between 45 and 59 years old (57 per cent), and those with
some college or a college degree (57 per cent).
These statistics suggest that those with easily identified class
interests - those groups who most clearly won or lost economically
during the Reagan years - voted those interests in the 1988 presiden-
tial election. But what about the not insigitificant proportion of the
voting public whose interests were more ambiguous? As noted above,
the real income of fully 80 per cent of American families declined
during the ten years prior to 1988. For many of these voters, who
they voted for depended in large part on how they defmed themselves
and how they defmed the clientele of the Democratic and the
Republican parties. And here again the limited terms of political
discourse advantaged the Republicans. The penchant for all but the
poorest and richest Americans to consider themselves 'middle class' is
not new, but the perception of this middle-class existence changed
significantly in the 1980s. The norm was no longer defmed by the
blue-collar row houses of the 1930s and 1940s, nor even by the
modest suburban tracts of the 1950s and 1960s. The 'imperial middle',
as defmed since the late 1970s, has had a decidedly upper-middle-
class character.16 It is not that most Americans actually live this
upper-middle-class existence, nor even that most of them believe that
they do. Instead it is that the vast majority of Americans identify with
this lifestyle, aspire to it, and believe (perhaps fantasize is the more
appropriate word) that it is within their reach or the reach of their
children.
This distorted self-identification has implications for political rheto-
ric, and for how this rhetoric is received. Again the range of discoUrse is
constrained as appeals not aimed at the- imperial middle are viewed with
suspicion. However, the misidentification of most people with the upper
middle class means that the objective interests of most Americans are
not addressed. Policies that most directly advantage the wealthiest 10 or
20 per cent of the population are successfully packaged as benefiting the
'average' American. At the same time, policies that are far more likely to
improve the lot of real.middle Americans (let alone those on the lower
rungs of the economic ladder) are rejected out of hand. Nowhere is this
clearer than in the 1980s debate over taxation. The evidence clearly
establishes that income tax cuts have disproportionately benefited the
wealthiest segments of America, while increases in 'flat' taxes (gasoline,
alcohol and tobacco taxes, ,sales taxes and lotteries) disproportionately
fall on the shoulders of the lower middle class and below. Nonetheless,
the rhetoric of 'no new taxes' won the day for both Ronald Reagan and
George Bush throughout the 19805. Indeed, Walter Mondale's aclmowl-
edgement that he would raise taxes if elected president in 1984 was
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viewed as political suicide within the limited confmes of political dis-
course in the 1980s.
The implications of the 'upscaling' of middle Anlerica's self-image
were especially apparent in the 1988 presidential campaign. In many
ways the election was similar to most that have occurred since the New
Deal. The election hinged on which party could most successfully appeal
to middle America. On the one hand, Michael Dukakis had to convince
the American public that George Bush and the Republicans were repre-
sentatives of the rich, and so not in touch \vith the needs of middle
America. Bush, on the other hand, had to convince them that Dukakis
and the Democrats were the party of the 'deseIVing poor' and other
marginal groups, and so out of touch with the needs of middle America.
Where a majority of Americans would align themselves if they 'properly
understood'their self-interest is an open question, but the illusion of the
imperial middle made this issue moot: in a choice between Michael
Dukakis's and George Bush's images of middle America. the latter rung
more true in the discourse of the 19805.
The four years of the Bush administration clearly demonstrated
which class interests were selVed by his election. Significant in both
symbolic and real terms, his Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Com-
merce were 'graduates of the best private schools, second- or third-
generation multimillionaires with a collective net worth of about $250
million'.17 While agreeing to a modestly regressive tax increase, Presi-
dent Bush continued to hold the line against progressive income tax
reform. Unable - for political and economic reasons - to raise cOlporate
or income taxes, state governmentS continued to shift the tax burden to
those least able to bear it through regressive measures like sales tax, gas
tax, lotteries, and so forth.t8 While unable to convince Congress, Bush
continued to lobby for a cut in the capital gains tax. Federal aid to
social programmes, the cities, education and so forth continued to
decline relative to inflation, while almost inconceivable amounts of
money were allocated to bail out the savings and loan and banking
industries. And while a deep recession hit all sectors of the US
economy, those who never recovered from· the recession of 1982 were
driven even deeper into poverty and despair. As KeVin Phillips notes,
... the America Bush tmly represented was that of old multigenera-
tional wealth - of trust funds, third-generation summer cottages on
Fischer's Island and grandfathers with Dillon Read or Brown Broth-
ers Harriman - which accepted the economic policy of the Reagan
era despite its distaste for its arriviste values ... The Republicans had
evolved from 'cloth coat' Middle Americanism under Richard Nixon
to aggressive new-money capitalism under Ronald Reagan and fmally
to the old-money, Episcopal establishment under George Herbert
Walker Bush.19
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In the midst of this continued dismantling of the welfare state and the
steady rise in poverty, attitudes continued to harden regarding crime';and
drug use. Entering the 1990s, the United States led the industrial world
in the percentage of its population that was in jail. Punishment rather
than rehabilitation has become the goal of criminal justice. Talk of root
causes for poverty and crime are more likely to mean genetic than
social, and references to the 'deselVing' poor hearken back to the social
datwinism and draconian policies of the nineteenth centwy. In this
constrained ideological space, liberal defences of the welfare state take
on a hollow, unrealistic ring.
Gender Politics, Gender Economics,
and the New Traditionalism
As with blacks and the poor, the struggles for women's political,
economic, and social liberation are closely intertwined. In the colonial
era, the right to participate in politics was tied to the ownership of
property.20 Since few women legally controlled the wealth they helped
produce, formal political participation - either through voting or
holding public office - was rare. Nonetheless, since women did
occasionally hold title to land (most often through inheritance or
through the death of husbands) political participation by women was
not unheard of prior to the formation of the United States. Ironically,
the revolution for independence in 1776 set in motion the loss 'of
even those limited political rights. The constitution of the United
States left it to the states to determine who was eligible to. vote.
Property restrictions were maintained in most states, but these
restrictions were at first reduced, and by the 1830s, essentially
eliminated. With the loss of this de facto barrier to the vast majority
of women, the states faced the issue of women's suffrage directly.
Their response was explicitly to limit the franchise to males. Despite
an active role by women in the abolitionist movement and a vocal
suffragette movement in the late nineteenth century, not until 1920
were women granted the right to vote throughout the United States.
Of course the winning of this formal' right was only one step in
the larger emancipation of women. Key to this emancipation was the
ability to gain control of their labour. While women had always
worked, their work was tied to the household - working the family
farm, giving birth and raising children, doing domestic chores, and so
forth. As such, women's experience with and authority in the 'public'
realm was limited. In addition, the equating of public with political, a
central tenet of liberal democracy, further discounted the civic worth
of women. Initially, the ability ·of women to escape the confmes of
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home resulted from larger social forces - most often war. Just prior to
the Second World War, about 25 per cent of women worked outside
the home. During the war, 6 million women took Jobs for the fust
time. And, despite successful efforts to force women out of the
workplace after the war, in 1950 34 per cent of women were still
working outside the home.21
The 1960s and 1970s were critical, if only partially successful,
decades for the women's movement. Between 1960 and 1980 the per
cent of women working outside the home rose from 38 per cent to
52 per cent, the largest increase in any 20-year period in US history.
During this period. female voter turnout (relative to men) continued
to rise, with women accounting for over half the votes cast in a
presidential election for the fust time in 1980. Only 35 per cent of
those graduating from college in 1960 were women, but by 1971 this
had increased to 42 per cent, and by the early 1980s more women
than men were graduating from college. The number of single women
increased in the 19605 and 1970s. Birth rates, which had risen
dramatically after the Second World War, began to decline in the late
1950s, and remained low throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This latter
trend was aided when, in 1960, the Food and Drug Administration
approved the birth control pill.
Increasingly freed from the home, women took active leadership
roles in a number of the civil rights and New Left organizations that
formed in the 1960s. In addition, the number of grassroots and
government organizations devoted exclusively to women increased. In
1964, aware that women needed -to be organized as women if they
were going to have their agenda addressed by the political system, the
National Organization for Women (NOW) was formed. And while the
Presidential Commission on the Status of Women, established by
President Kennedy, ultimately concluded that an equal rights amend-
ment was not necessary, it did draw national attention to 'problems of
discrimination in employment, unequal pay, lack of social services
such as childcare, and continuing legal inequality'. 22 In '1963 Kennedy
issued a presidential order requiring that civil selVice hires be made
'without regard to sex'. In that same year Congress passed the Equal
Pay Act, which required private employers to provide equal pay for
the same work.:l3
By the 1970s, the women's movement was the dominant social
movement in the United States. Having had their agenda and their
participation marginalized in many of the male-dominated New Left
organizations, the feminist movement· struck off on its own. As the
movement grew, its agenda expanded. While entrance of women into
the public world remained a goal, feminists also came to argue that
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the personal was political. Increasingly, the women's movement s~w
and developed the links between feminism and issues such as class,
race, sexual preference and militarism. The result was a much more
heterogeneous, less middle-class movement.
As in the 1960s, the movement could point to tangible, if limited,
results. In 1972 Congress passed Title IX· of the Higher Education
Act, which prohibited sexual discrimination in any education pro-
gramme receiving federal aid. The enforcement capacity and jurisdic-
tion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was ex-
panded. And the tax codes were changed to allow working parents to
deduct childcare costs. In 1973 the women's movement won what is
arguably its greatest victory when the Supreme Court handed down its
abortion decision in Roe vs. Wade.
As with both race and class, these victories constituted only the
beginnings of a move towards a just society. Throughout this period,
women continued to earn only 60 per cent of what men did, largely
because women remained disproportionately in less valued and less
well-paid jobs. The Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress in
1972, fell several states short of ratification. While the number of
women elected to local office increased, their representation in Con-
gress remained a paltry 4 per cent. The ability to work outside the
home often came in addition to maintaining primary responsibilities
for raising the family, doing the housework, and so forth. The vast
majority of single-parent households were headed by women, adding to
the fmancial and psychological burdens of working women. In a
work-place and society unprepared to address these issues, women in
general and women heads of households in particular made' up a
disproportionate segment of the poor..
At best, the 1980s represented a holding period for the feminist
movement. While women continued to vote, attend college and work
outside the home at relatively high rates, few tangible gains were
achieved in the workplace or the political arena. The election of
Ronald Reagan, supported as he was by the fundamentalist New
Right, signalled a shift away from the feminist agenda of the 19605
and 1970s. The new conselVative social agenda, claiming to be
pro-family, pro-life and pro-traditional values, was a thinly veiled
attempt to tum back the clock on gains made by women. Women
continued to win symbolic victories such as the appointment of
Sandra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court and the vice presidential
nomination of Geraldine Ferraro, but the substantive battles in the
workplace, the voting booths, the courts and in Congress were being
lost with greater frequency. Court decisions regarding Title IX, and
Congressional llmitations on federal funding for abortion, limited the
248 AN AMERICAN HALP-C ENTURY
scope of gains made in the 1970s. Legitimate concern over issues of
child abuse, drop-out rates, teenage pregnancy and juvenile crime were
twisted in subtle and not so subtle ways so as to be blamed on the
changes wrought by the women's movement. The term feminism itself
began to take on a negative connotation, even among those who
supported its goals. Women's organizations were put increasingly on
the defensive, having to devote time and resources to the maintenance
of gains already made rather than to the pursuit of new ones. The few
new initiatives developed during the 19805, such as comparable worth,
were met with great scepticism and resulted in only marginal, local
success.
Women themselves, never as homogeneous a political block as
other disadvantaged groups, were tom by the Reagan counter-revolu-
tion. Nonetheless, in general women were less likely to support the
conselVative agenda or to vote for Ronald Reagan. In 1980, for
example, 47 per cent of women voted for Reagan, compared to 55
per cent of men. In 1984 the percentage of women supporting Reagan
had increased to 57 per cent, though this was still less than the 61
per cent of men who did. Unmarried and/or working women were a
good deal less likely to vote for Reagan than married women and/or
women who worked at home. Women were also less supportive than
men of many of the conservative social and economic programmes of
the Reagan administration. To the extent that any group supported
the New Left agenda during the 1980s, it was women.
George Bush's personal attitudes about women were on record as
early as 1984, when he announced, prior to his debate with Geraldine
Ferraro, that he was going to 'kick a little ass'. In the 1988 campaign,
while distancing himself somewhat from the populist far right, he
opposed abortion and favoured the overturning of Roe vs. Wade. As
much as through policy stands and campaign rhetoric, however, the
'new traditionalism' evident in the late 1980s could be seen through
the popularity of Barbara Bush." In many ways she was the consum-
mate pre-1960s woman: a housewife who devoted "herself to her
children and to her husband's career. There was little need for George
Bush to articulate his view of women or of their roles in society. His
view and his party's view (which had removed support for an equal
rights amendment from its national platform in the 1980s) was
expressed best and most accurately through the image of his wife.
Indeed, in a campaign process lacking the language or means openly
to discuss core issues such as the role of women, public comparisons
between the 'liberated' Kitty Dukakis and the 'old-fashioned' Barbara
Bush selVed as surrogates for public debate.
Michael Dukakis, fearing a conservative backlash, downplayed his
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pro-choice, pro-women stands. In this muted public discourse, in which
the logic and ethic of women's liberation went largely undefended," the
American public chose George (and Barbara) Bush, 53 per cent to '47
per cent. More significantly, of the 20 per cent of the electorate (as
measured in exit polls) who considered abortion one of the most
important issues of the election, 63 per cent voted for Bush. As a
group, women were less supportive of Bush (50 per cent) than were
men (57 per cent). Unmarried women, especially likely to be adversely
affected by the new traditionalism, supported Dukakis by a 57 per cent
to 42 per cent margin. It is difficult to know what difference a more
forceful defence of women's liberation might have made to the Dukakis
campaign - a case could be made that the differences between the two
candidates and parties were clear by election day. Nonetheless, evidence
of the potential of the gender gap can be seen by looking at early
support for the two candidates. In May of 1988, when Dukakis was
more aggressively advocating women's issues, males were split evenly
between Bush and Dukakis in public opinion polls. Women, however,
supported Dukakis 53 per cent to 35.
Once again the 1988 campaign proved an accurate marker of what
was to come. Executive orders banned the use of US foreign aid
(both directly to individual countries and through contributions to UN
organizations) for information about, or the performance of, abortions.
In the Webster case, the Supreme Court chipped away significantly at
the foundations of Roe vs. Wade. Throughout the 1980s Congress
had prohibited the use of federal funds for abortions, but in the 1991
Rust case, the Supreme Court upheld the executive order preventing
counsellors at federally funded family planning clinics froni .even
mentioning abortion as an option ,for dealing with a pregnancy.
Significantly, George Bush's appointee to the Supreme Court, David
Souter, was the critical vote in that decision. Bolstered by these
decisions and by the president's vocal support, anti-abortion groups
increased their activities, and numerous state legislators introduced
increasingly conselVative abortion legislation. Despite the mobilization
of numerous pro-choice groups against this reactionary movement,
such limiting legislation has passed in s.everal states. The ruling in
'Planned Parenthood vs. Casey' (1992) suggests that this Republican-
appointed Court is willing to stop short of overturning Roe vs. Wade,
but it also reinforced the right of states to legislate restrictions that
did not impose 'undue burdens' on the women seeking abortions. In
addition, the timing of this decision - during a presidential election
year - and the slim majority on which the decision rests, make it
difficult to know what the long-term plans of this Court actually are.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome, however, the mere fact of this
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debate demonstrates the extent to which the gains of the 1960s and
1970s were under attack in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Though in a different way, the nomination of Clarence Thomas to
the Supreme Court was as significant for women as for blacks. His
stands on abortion and affumative action were serious threats to a
number of gains made by women during the 1970s. And the televised,
often torturous hearings regarding Anita Hill's accusations of sexual
harassment drew unprecedented public attention to this usually ignored
problem. The public discourse generated by those hearings, and the
visible evidence of the price paid by women (and blacks) for their
underrepresentation in government, played a major role in mobilizing
women in the 1992 elections. As such it selVes as a hopeful reminder of
the public's ability to respond politically and conununally to perceived
injustices. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that immediately
following the hearings, majorities of men and women, blacks and whites,
supported Thomas over Hill. And, in the end, Clarence Thomas was
confumed to the Supreme Court.
Setbacks for women have come in other arenas as well. The contin-
ued rise in poverty, the cutbacks in already limited social spending, the
general downturn in the economy - all disproportionately affected
women. The domestic violence and crime that inevitably increases in
hard economic times also fell most heavily on women. And, as US and
international industry attempts to subvert and sidestep union contracts
and government regulation, the most tedious, dangerous and low-paying
work continues to be shipped out to the Third World, where, again,
women are most likely to be exploited.
Flags, Tanks and a Kinder, Gentler Nation
US public opinion concerning foreign affairs generally and military
intelVention more specifically has always been a curious mix of isolation-
ism and jingoism. In general, Americans oppose the use of troops
abroad, but this tendency, with few exceptions, is easily overwhelmed by
appeals to patriotism, self-interest and the horrific nature of the enemy.
Whether that enemy is 'godless communism', 'a' tin-pot dictator' or
'Hitler incarnate', this villainization allo,vs the strategic, ideological and
economic reasons for intelVention to be viewed as moral ones. This
mentality is especially easy to evoke when the enemy is culturally,
religiously and ethnically different from the white, "European, Christian,
middle-class elite that still defmes America's increasingly inaccurate
self-image.
As the only conflict in US history to be opposed by a majority of
Americans 1vhile troops were engaged in combat, the Vietnam War
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stands out as a notable, if only partial, exception to this pattern.~4
That public opinion turned against the war in 1968 is clear. Between
November 1967 and Februaty 1968 those believing the US .was
making progress in the war dropped from 51 per cent to 32. By late
March 1968 President Johnson's approval rating had fallen to 26 •per
cent, a 13 point drop in less than fIVe months. By April 1968, a
majority of Americans opposed the war for the frrst time. Public
agreement that the United States had made a mistake in sending
troops into Vietnam went from 39 per cent in late 1967 to 52 per
cent in early 1969.25 This unprecedented loss of support resulted from
a variety of factors: genuine concern about the war's morality; growing
horror at the human cost of war as portrayed.on television; a sense
that the war was either unwinnable or would be too costly in
American lives and money to win; and a desire to end the increasing
tension at home.
The Vietnam era profoundly influenced the ways in which the general
public, political leaders and military people think about war. As with
many of the changes that occurred as a result of the 1960s, however,
little open, constructive dialogue took place. Indeed, so complex, intense
and ambiguous were the feelings resulting from America's defeat, that
immediate public reaction was to repress, rather than reflect on, the
experiences and lessons of Vietnam.26 The result was a political vacuum,
interspersed with disconnected, often contradictory beliefs, attitudes and
opinions, concerning the role of force in foreign relations.
The fast serious attempt to fill this vacuum was made during the
Carter administration. Building more off the public's weariness than its
active support, Carter implemented many of the foreign policies'advo-
cated by the New Left. Covert action and limited warfare were no
longer the central tools for achieving US goals abroad. The US devel-
oped a relatively coherent human rights policy, which was integrated
into its larger foreign policy. Defence spending declined, as did the sale
of armaments to foreign nations. The US also allowed nations and
regions greater autonomy in settling their own internal disputes, and
attempted to integrate its foreign policies into a global, international
framework.
The Vietnam era provided the left with ·a rare opportunity to shift
public discourse on foreign policy. Even this modest shift was short-
lived, however. The 'stagflation' of the late 1970s (created in part by
OPEC's oil embargo), the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion
of Mghanistan, were quickly interpreted by both Democratic and Re-
publican leaders as the failure of Carter's well-intentioned but naive
approach to foreign affairs.
The failure of the left fully to exploit the opportunity provided by the
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Vietnamera allowedthe right to regain control of the political agenda. This
shifting discourse could be seen in the cultural politics of the 1980s, The
brief reign of the 'anti-hero' - the 1960s' and early 1970s' somewhat
nihilistic response to the Vietnam era - ended, replaced by a growing
machismo. The Vietnam 'revenge' fdm, exemplified by the series ofRambo
movies, became popular. 27 Movies like Top Gun, little more than multi-
miIlion-dollar advertisements for the armed services, fuelled a growing
infatuation with the military. The victory of the US hockey team over the
Soviets in the 1980 winter Olympics was covered like a surrogate military
victolY over this arch-enemy, while the 1984 Olympics, set appropriately
in Los Angeles, became one long, colourful commercial for America. The
increasingly reactionary approach to domestic politics (discussed above)
dovetailed nicelywith this new 'macho' mentality.
Ronald Reagan, his image crafted more by his movies than his
political past, was a key to translating this cultural and social conselVa-
tism into public policy. His patriotic 'get tough' attitude proved the
perfect panacea for a nation unable to accept a changing world order.
During Reagan's tenure, military spending increased dramatically, as did
the willingness to use it. Indeed, the eight years between America's fmal
withdrawal from Vietnam and Reagan's stationing of Marines in Beirut
increasingly seem a mere respite from 40 years of US military interven-
tion in Third World nations.
The deployment of US troops in Lebanon proved a misguided flexing
of muscle that resulted in the largest loss of US troops since Vietnam.
Such a disaster could easily have been interpreted as evidence of the
limits of military solutions to international problems. However, within
days of the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, US troops invaded
Grenada, silencing critics as Democrats and Republicans 'rallied round
the flag'. Presented with photographs and news copy orchestrated by the
military, and given little reason to question the necessity, legality or
morality of the invasion, Americans applauded this long-sought military
victolY'
Reagan next set his sights on Nicaragua. Unlike Grenada, however,
the administration faced substantial Congressional and public opposition
to direct military intelVention. This opposition provides an important
example of both the ambiguous, malleable nature of the public's new-
found militarism, and the difficulty in translating specific points of
resistance into a more general critique of military intervention with a
more coherent oppositional ideology. Numerous grassroots organizations
in the United States opposed intelVention in Central America, and were
able, within limits, to get this message to the general public and to
members of Congress. While many of these groups had fairly sophisti-
cated critiques of the situation, and saw the struggles in Nicaragua (and
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El Salvador) as part of a larger set of issues, it was seldom on th~se
ideological grounds that the case was made to the American public~ For
strategic reasons, it was assumed that neither the general public not a
majority of Congresspeople would oppose the administration's Nicara-
guan policy on broad, philosophic grounds. In essence, the lack of a
language with which to debate such issues (as well as the lack of public
arenas in which to debate them in any serious way) meant that the
argument would have to be made on a more visceral, case-specific ·basis.
In the case of Nicaragua, this symbolic 'hook' was Vietnam.
By and large this strategy was successful. Despite concerted efforts
by the Reagan administration to convince them otbelWise, the Ameri-
can public saw this fight as too similar to Vietnam: the vague,
ideological justifications for intelVention; the domestic nature of the
dispute between the Sandinistas and the Contras; the gradual escala-
tion of US involvement; the jungle terrain; the likelihood of a
protracted engagement.
Given an environment in which 'legitimate' spokespersons provided
alternatives to intelVention in ways that struck a responsive chord, the
public was capable of opposing the use of military force abroad. Absent
a more comprehensive, informed and reasoned logic, however, there was
little likelihood that the public's specific opposition to the use of uS
force in Nicaragua would lead to a rethinking of other aspects of foreign
policy. The Reagan administration quickly (and correctly) concluded
that, while the public would support quick, decisive military excursions,
it still suffered from 'the Vietnam syndrome'. In the short run., US
military objectives in Nicaragua (and elsewhere) would require the use
of surrogate troops and, ultimately, covert actions. The United' States
could arm the Contras, the Mghanistan rebels, the EI Salvadoran death
squads and the like, and could provide military advisers and technical
assistance to them, but the US public, much to the dismay of political
and military leaders, was still gun shy. Direct military action would have
to be limited to relatively defenceless opponents and/or to quick strikes
(e.g. the bombing of Libya).
The Irancontra affair resulted, in part, from the administration's
failure to mobilize public support for US military intelVention in Nicara-
gua.28 The resulting scandal did some damage to the Reagan presidency.
It also provided an opportunity for rethinking the rightward lurch of US
foreign policy. However, the absence of investigative reporting in the
mainstream press, the relative lack of public outrage, the momentary
hero-status of Oliver North, the aborted criminal cases, and the lack of
direct fallout for either Ronald Reagan or George Bush, instead signalled
a general resignation as to the inevitability of such actions, setting the
stage for an even more aggressive foreign policy.
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As with the other policy areas discussed in this essay, the 1988
election provides ample evidence for this atavism. George Bush, while
only a few years older than Michael Dukakis, was, unlike Dukakis, old
enough to have served in the Second World War. His worldview was
very much shaped by that experience, and by the Cold War mentality
that dominated the following four decades. He was a fonner director of
the CIA. He was clearly involved at some level in the covert operations
surrounding the Irancontra dealings. During his campaign he appealed to
the lowest forms of blind patriotism with his visits to flag factories and
his attack on Dukakis's veto of a 'pledge of allegiance' bill in Massachu-
setts. He also played up his military past, using fdm footage of his
rescue-at-sea during the Second World War in his television campaign.
Dukakis, though running on a much less militarist platform, quickly
tried to out-macho Bush. In the process, he not only lost credibility with
the voters, but he unwittingly helped shrink the already narrow range of
discourse on foreign policy. His visit to a military base, where he rode
about in a tank, backfued so badly that fIlm footage of his joy ride was
used in Bush commercials. Dukakis also fed the growing jingoism by
playing on American fears of foreign (especially Arab and Asian) owner-
ship of US businesses and property, and by constantly alluding to
Bush's cosy relationship with Manuel Noriega. Even the media's fascina-
tion with Bush's 'wimpiness' and Dukakis's diminutive physical stature
fuelled the growing machismo in America.
Particularly revealing was the controversy surrounding Dan Quayle's
avoidance of combat in Vietnam by enlisting in the Indiana National
Guard. Quayle was the fust 'Vietnam generation' politician to be nomi-
nated for so visible an office. As such, it marked an important stage in
America's public reconsideration of that era. That the central contro-
versy raised by his nomination was his failure to fight, strongly indicates
the extent to which public discourse over the war in Vietnam had been
captured by the right. This shift is also seen in the negative publicity
generated by the 'allegations' that Kitty Dukakis participated in anti-war
protests during the early 1970s. .
In the end, the campaigns of both Michael Dukakis and George Bush
addressed foreign policy and defence issues in a way that legitimized the
hardline approach of the 1980s. I am not, of course, arguing that the
1988 campaign presented the American public with an open, informative
debate on foreign policy and defence issues. It did, however, symboli-
cally address these issues in ways that established -George Bush's hard-
line credentials. And this message was not missed by the public. Within
this constrained dialogue, George Bush and the Republicans were at a
decided advantage. 'National defence' was the second most frequent
issue mentioned by voters in the 1988 election, when asked in exit polls
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to explain their vote. And of those that mentioned this issue,. ~n
astounding 84 per cent voted for Bush.
A Second World War fighter pilot who once headed the CIA, ..and
who was fighting to live down the reputation of being a wimp, isa
dangerous combination for a commander-in-ehief. Not swprisingly! it
wasn't long before US soldiers were back fighting in the Third World.
The invasion of Panama represented a new phase in the return to
limited warfare that had begun during the Reagan administration~ The
enemy was slightly more formidable and the legitimacy of the action less
clear (there was, for example, no 'invitation' from neighbouring coun-
tries, as there had been in the Grenada invasion). Again, however, the
invasion was met with strong support from the American public. Unlike
Reagan's failure to mobilize support against Nicaragua, Bush success-
fully built a consensus for the use of American troops. Throughout the
1988 campaign, and, even more so during the fust months of 1989, the
Bush administration painted Manuel Noriega as a drug-selling, mad,
ruthless dictator. Using the combination of tight media controls ·and
relatively quick military action that had been so successful in Grenada,
popular opinion was rallied around the new president's use of force. The
invasion of Panama was less 'clean' than Grenada's had been - the
fighting lasted longer, there were more civilian casualties, Noriega
proved somewhat more difficult to capture than had been expected, and
almost four years after the invasion, thousands of US troops remain in
Panama. Nonetheless, the invasion was an unqualified political success.,
Despite the use of force in Panama, events in Eastern Europe. and
the Soviet Union raised hopes that the major source of international
tension over the last 40 years was waning. The way in which' these
events were intetpreted is instructive..The rapid collapse of 'hardline'
Communist regimes could have generated several public dialogues: Was
the Soviet Union the military and economic threat the American public
was led to believe over the past 35 years? What were the successes ana
failures of this particular variant of Communism, and might there·· be
lessons that would be instructive not only for the East, but for the West
as well?
Of course, the world events of 1989 and 1990 were actually inter-
preted in the United States through the myopic lenses fashioned during
the 1980s. The 'collapse of Communism' simply reinforced the 'triumph
of capitalism'. Complex events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
were treated as simple and homogeneous, while at the same time no
connections were drawn between events there and those in Mrica, South
and Central America, or the United States. Strikes in Soviet coal mines
were covered widely in the US press, put forth as evidence of their
struggle for 'freedom', while striking coal miners in Kentucky and West
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Vuginia went largely unnoticed and, when covered, were presented as
emblematic of the failed strategy of unions in the United States. The
defeats of Communists in elections in Eastern Europe were extensively
covered, while the successes of socialists in South American elections
were ignored.29 The opportunity for the United States to participate
constructively in both an international and domestic dialogue was lost.
In the end, rather than diminishing the probability of US military
action, the breakup of the Eastern bloc actually increased it. The use of
military force was becoming the only way in which the administration
could assert its will overseas and divert public attention from the
increasing number of seemingly intractable problems at home. The
political and economic upheaval in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe
and China led to great uncertainty concerning the future balance of
world power, adding to the administration's sense of urgency in control-
ling those events. However, economic pressure, once America's alterna-
tive to military force, was increasingly ineffective as Japan, a united
Germany and a restructured European Community presented formidable
economic and political rivals. In addition, despite the Soviet Union's
own problems, Mikhail Gorbachev had become the dominant political
leader on the international scene, shaping world opinion in ways usually
resetved for US presidents. Finally, the 'end of the Cold War' also
meant that a very large American military (and the sizeable weapons
industry that had built up around it) was looking for new ways to earn
its keep. For a short while the administration continued to focus on
Latin America, this time using the military to take the war on drugs
overseas. This policy failed to gamer the kind of public support gener-
ated by the invasions of Grenada and Panama, however, and also lacked
the international visibility necessary to thrust the United States back
into the centre of international politics. The Panama invasion had
demonstrated the value of creating an identifiable villain so as to build
and maintain public support for the use of military force.3o In August of
1990, Saddam Hussein, the 'new Hitler', provided George Bush with
~d~~a~~ .
While it is clear that Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was a serious
violation of intemationallaw, it is also clear that, from the start, George
Bush's strategy was aimed at the use of military force. The US made
little effort to fmd a diplomatic solution to the rising tensions between
Iraq and Kuwait in the fust half of 1990.31 Once Iraq invaded Kuwait,
however, the administration set off on an intransigent policy seemingly
designed to prevent negotiation from working. International efforts on
the part of the US were all focused exclusively on putting together,
through economic and political incentives and threats, a coalition to
legitimize the use of force. Efforts by others to reach a negotiated
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solution were ignored or sabotaged by the US, though the appearanc~of
negotiation was kept up. The day after Congressional elections took
place in November, Bush escalated the commitment of troops, shifting
the US military from a defensive posture to an offensive one. At the
same time, rhetoric shifted from the defence of Saudi Arabia to the
liberation of Kuwait. Additional references· were made to protecting
American interests and 'the American way of life'. Mer giving sanctions
less than half the six months it was originally estimated it would .take
for them to have a serious impact on Iraq, the administration began to
push aggressively for a military solution. Iraq, at several points, appeared
willing to pull out of all but a few disputed areas of Kuwait, if it could
be done in a way that would 'save face' for Hussein and the Iraqi
people. But George Bush, in true John Wayne (or Ronald Reagan?)
style, responded that Hussein 'doesn't need any face - he needs to get
out of Kuwait'. Efforts on the part of the Iraqis, Jordanians, Palestinians
and Soviets to tie a retreat from Kuwait to a conference addressing
larger issues of stability, national boundaries and militarism in the
Middle East were rebuffed by the us. In late November the US, again
using its economic and political influence, was able to orchestrate a UN
resolution authorizing the use of 'any means necessary' to force Iraq out
of Kuwait after 15 January 1991. On Saturday, 12 January, after only
two days of debate, both Houses of Congress narrowly passed resolu-
tions concurring with the UN resolution. One day after the 15 Januaty
deadline, the US, along with its allies, began the aerial bombardment of
Iraq and Kuwait. After six weeks of unimaginably intense bombing, and
several days of 'mopping up' with ground troops, the Iraqis were forced
out of Kuwait. .
The march from the rhetoric of the 1980 presidential campaign, to
the militaty buildup of the early 1980s, to the invasions of progressively
larger and more distant nations (Grenada, Panama and Iraq) seems to
have provided the American public with ample information about the
Republican Party's vision of 'the new world order'. And the nearly
unanimous support given to each of these invasions, coupled with the
Republican presidential victories in 1980, 1984 and 1988, suggests that
a substantial majority of the public approved of this vision. Nonetheless,
the limited nature of public discourse during the 1980s and early 1990s
begs the question of how citizens would have reacted if given the
opportunity to consider a range of altemativesp2 The' ability of the
administration to manage public opinion successfully was especially clear
during the Gulf War. The military, led by soldiers who were field
commanders, fighter pilots and the like in Vietnam, were aware that a
gradual buildup of troops and a slow escalation in fighting would erode
public support for the war. The. massive initial concentration of troops
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in Saudi Arabia and the unparalleled use of force against the Iraqis was
the direct result of this 'reading' of Vietnam. Decisions as to what
targets to bomb, when and how to deploy ground troops, how best. to
limit US and civilian casualties, whether or not to institute a draft, and
so forth, were based as much on how it would play on the evening news
as on its military value. Similarly, the careful censorship of media
reports, the use of a pool arrangement in which journalists were es-
corted to designated sites, the barrage of carefully edited fdm. footage of
(supposedly) successful airstrikes, the regular briefmgs by militaIy and
administration spokespersons, and the constant reprimands to the media
about any reports that did not tow the administration line, were all
aimed at winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the American
public by limiting the possibility of alternative interpretations of
events.33
The administration was also remarkably effective at shaping the
public's collective memory of the Vietnam War and the anti-war pro-
tests, thereby helping to assure support for the Gulf War. A key
component of this manufactured consensus was establishing the myth
that the war in Vietnamwas lost because the military was forced to fight
'with one ann tied behind its back'. Of course, while Vietnam was a
limited war, this simplification flies in the face· of a ten-year war in
which 50,000 Americans and countless more North and South Vietnam-
ese died, hundreds of thousands of people were maimed, North Viet-
namese cities were carpet bombed, entire villages in both North and
South Vietnam were destroyed, acres of forest defoliated, and billions of
dollars spent. Absent a forceful articulation of these facts, however, and
given a decade of subtle and not so subtle recreations of the Vietnam
era, the administration's revisionist interpretation became accepted his-
toty.
Similarly, the administration was able to caricature the Vietnam War
protests as the acts of a few marginal and unpatriotic individuals whose
influence was blown out of proportion by the media. In addition, the
target of these protests, according to this revisionist history, was the GI
himself. Again, absent a strong refutation, half truths become whole
ones. While the anti-war movement of the early 1960s did represent a
minority of the population, it was consistently portrayed in a negative
light by the mainstream press. Not until middle America turned against
the war in large numbers were protestors presented as legitimate.34 In
addition, while some returning GIs were mistreated by some anti-war
protestors, these incidents were exceptions. Protestors opposed the
policy, the administration and (for the most sophisticated protestors)
the system that produced the war. The soldiers fighting the war were
viewed as victims, not villains. Indeed, many protestors were vets and/or
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the parents, siblings, friends and lovers of those serving in thew:ar.
Nonetheless, the successful portrayal of those who opposed the Vietn.am
War as unpatriotic was one of the great strategic victories of the right.
In doing so, it robbed those who were potential opponents to the Gulf
War of their strongest role model, and intimidated both protestors and
the media into a much narrower range of discourse.
The success of the Gulf War, like the wisdom of the decision to
go to war itself, is as much a matter of interpretation as of fact.
Certainly the relative ease with which the Iraqis were defeated and
their apparent inability to use either chemical or nuclear weapons
should raise doubts about the need for such a massive use of force.
And the staggering fmancial cost of the war, the loss of as many as
200,000 Iraqi lives, the incredible destruction in Kuwait and Iraq, the
further dislocation of the Kurds, the environmental disaster in the
Gulf, the repression of the pro-democracy movements in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, and fmally, the continued rule of Saddam Hussein,
provide credible reasons for questioning the logic and ethic of the
Gulf War. For these critical interpretations to take hold, however,
they must be articulated by spokespeople with ·access to the main-
stream media, and as with so -many of the issues discussed here, the
Democrats have been unwilling to play this role.
Card-carrying ACLU Members and the L-word
The 1930s and 1960s, for all their reformist tendencies, did modestly
expand political discourse in the United States by rethinking the role of
government, and by putting issues of class, race, sex and militariSm on
the political agenda. Perhaps the most significant, lasting achievement of
the Reagan-Bush era has been to force many aspects of these issues out
of the mainstream by redefming what Daniel Hallin calls the spheres of
consensus, legitimate controversy and deviance.35 While the shrinking ~f
acceptable political discourse is evident in each of the specific examples
discussed above, frrst Reagan and then Bush made more general attacks
on liberalism, and on the role of government in American society.
For Reagan, the rhetorical enemy was Washington. Under the rubric
of new federalism, he attacked national government as too big, too
distant and too inefficient to address people's needs. State and local
governments, he argued, were much better suited to this job. Part of
this argument required establishing (falsely) that the federal programmes
of the 1960s and 1970s were unmitigated f~ilures, that the federal
government was attempting to do too much and trying to solve prob-
lems simply by ·throwing money' at them. Of course, there is another
interpretation of these progranunes. Even programmes that worked were
260 AN AMERICAN HALF-CENTURY
underfunded, and declines in their success paralleled cuts in funding
relative to the size of the problem.36 In addition, the vast majority of
the federal bureaucracy was not located in Washington, but instead was
located in local, state and regional offices around the country. Finally,
most of the growth in bureaucracy that occurred in the 1960s and
1970s was not federal, but state and locaI.37 Nonetheless, absent a vocal
defence of past policies, and a reasoned debate on the strengths and
wealmesses of national, state and local government, Reagan was able to
convince much of America that the problems of race, poverty and so
forth could only be solved through a combination of trickle-down eco-
nomics and state and local action.38
While he attacked the role of national government, Reagan also
successfully shifted the ideological spectrum significantly to the right.
The New Left agenda was never fmnly entrenched in the mainstream,
and so was a relatively easy target for Reagan's not inconsiderable
rhetorical skills. This agenda was blamed for many of the political,
economic and moral problems facing the United States. In its stead
Reagan offered a New Right social agenda, advocating the preselVation
of the traditional family, prayer in schools, banning abortion, etc. This is
not to suggest that these New Right issues were accepted by a large
portion of the public, but rather that they became issues of serious
debate against which the centre and left were defmed.
This redefmition of the political arena continued in the 1.988 cam-
paign. By labelling Michael Dukakis a 'card-carrying member of the
ACLU', Bush was doing more than stating fact - he was defming the
ACLU as outside the realm of legitimate debate. Even the phrase
'card-canying' was designed to evoke the spectre of 'card-carrying com-
munists' fust raised during the McCarthy witchhunts of the 1950s. But
now the articulated bogey was not communists but members of an
established, mainstream civil rights group. Of course groups like the
ACLU were targets in the 1950s as well, but only under the guise of a
search for communists. Now the ACLU itself was being painted as
illegitimate.
A similar dynamic is found in the phrase 'a George McGovern
Liberal', commonly used by Bush to describe Dukakis during the 1988
campaign. In 1972 McGovern had represented the mainstream wing of
the New Left - the part that was willing to work within the electoral
system and the liberal democratic rules of the game. Despite his crush-
ing defeat, much of his agenda was taken up by- the Democratic Party
throughout the 1970s. Now his image was being used to evoke the
radicalism of the 1960s. In the use of this phrase, Bush not only
redefmed the New Left, painting its moderate representative as deviantly
radical, but also redefmed Dukakis by presenting his quite mainstream
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views as far more liberal than they actually were. In short, by shrin~g
the range of liberal, let alone leftist ideas deemed appropriate for pUblic
discourse, Bush further shifted the political consensus to the right, while
also constraining the sphere of legitimate controversy. The extent·· to
which discourse had become constrained in the United States is perhaps
best exemplified by Bush's frequent and derogatoJ.Y reference to the
'L-word' during the 1988 campaign. Not only was the label 'liberal' now
enough to connote deviance, but th~ word itself had become, somewhat
mockingly, literally unspeakable.
It was this confmed public space that made Bush's stands on race,
class, taxes, sex, foreign affairs and the like so effective. Reagan's
rhetoric shifted the domain of domestic politics from national to state
government, while Bush's rhetoric shifted it from government itself to
the voluntaJ.Y action of citizens. By narrowly defming the political
agenda and the range of acceptable political solutions, Bush forced
Dukakis, and so the Democratic Party more generally, either to out-
conseIVative Bush, to admit to views that were perceived as radically
deviant, or to remain silent. Of course Dukakis could have challenged
Bush's re-creation of the past, but for a variety of reasons (a concern
that Bush was correct in his assessment of the public mindset; the fact
that neither he nor the Democratic Party was strongly progressive; the
fact that the left had little choice but to support him) he did not opt for
this strategy until very late in the campaign. .
The ability of Reagan and Bush to redefme the terms of political
discourse did more than simply win elections. By agreeing to these
terms, the Democrats essentially closed off serious debate on a host of
economic and social problems for what constituted a 12-year morato-
rium. A generation of young Americans now perceive Jimmy Carter as a
softhearted liberal who failed precisely because he was liberal, and
George McGovern as a radical leftist. Questions of how government
should act have given way to debates over whether government shoUld
act at all.
None of this is to suggest that concerns over race, gender roles, the
environment, education, poverty and the like have disappeared. Few
mainstream politicians on the left or the right would publicly deny the
right to equal political and economic opportunity. Few would deny the
importance of education, or of preserving the environment. Few would
deny the need to help the poor and destitute. But it is precisely the
casual consensus on these issues that neutralizes their political rel-
evance. What is increasingly excised from public discourse is the con-
nection between these values and concrete, collective political action.
What is lost is the sense that govemment has anything but the most
tangential role °in assuring they. are achieved:39 The result is often a
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bizarre mix of rhetoric and action, in which candidates from both
parties run as Democrats and govern as Republicans. George Bush was
able to declare himself both the 'environmental' and the 'education'
president, while advocating policies that further limited the ability of
government to address either issue. David Dinkins won the mayoral race
in New York by running on a progressive agenda, yet, for reasons largely
beyond his control, slashed social programmes while increasing the size
of the police force. When, as a result, blacks, women, the poor and
other disadvantaged segments of American society fail to achieve the
levels of success now deemed their right, the implicit conclusion drawn
is that they must lack the 'right stuff.
The Election of 1992: One Step Forward?
In November of 1992, for the fust time in 16 years, the American
public elected a Democrat to be President of the United States. This
election marks an undeniable shift in the trends discussed above. While
there is much one can point to in the 1992 campaign as evidence of a
return to the progressive politics of the 1960s and 1970s, it would be a
mistake to draw such parallels without carefully considering the context
in which this election took place. Did Bill Clinton and the Democrats
win by accepting the terms of discourse as set by the Republicans over
the past twelve years, or by changing those terms? Will the Democrats
govern by honouring the limits of liberal democracy or by redefming
them? The evidence from the campaign, the election, and the early days
of the new administration is mixed:
For the fust time in US history, a black woman was elected to the
Senate in 1992. The number of blacks in the House increased from 25
to a record 38, including the fust blacks since Reconstruction to be
elected from five southern states (significantly, all but one of these black
officeholders were Democrats). And the election of Bill Clinton to the
presidency should mark a decided improvement in the style and sub-
stance of the politics of race in the United States. Certainly in much of
his rhetoric, Clinton has shown a great sensitivity to the plight of black
America. Nonetheless, a closer examination of the 1992 campaign and
election points out the extent to which the politics of the last twelve
years has constrained public discourse and thus lowered the expectations
of the left.
Much as in the campaigns of the 1980s, race was essentially a
non-issue in 1992. Jesse Jackson, the only national Democrat to address
issues of race in 1984 and 1988, did not run for the presidential
nomination in 1992, and was effectively muted during the general
election for fear that he would alienate the moderate white voters that
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Democrats were hoping to lure back to the party. Indeed, the fact. ~at
Jackson played only a marginal role during the Democratic convention
was viewed by political pundits as evidence of Clinton's strength.. The
most visible black Democrat during 1992 was Ron Brown, the party's
national chairperson, and a person with more corporate than civil rights
connections. While Clinton occasionally wooed black voters, he was
equally likely to use such opportunities to alleviate white fears about his
views. This tactic was clearly behind his public lambasting of the little
known rap singer Sister Souljah while speaking before the NAACP.
The low visibility of race as a campaign issue is especially troubling
given the context in which the campaign took place. Recall that during
the primary season the city of Los Angeles erupted in the most violent
and sustained racial uprising since the mid-1960s. Though triggered by a
'not-guilty' verdict for the policemen accused of - and videotaped while
- beating a black motorist, the root causes were clearly broader griev-
ances concerning racial injustices. While the beating, the verdict and the
subsequent turmoil received a great deal of media coverage, its impact
on campaign discourse was minimal and short-lived. Tellingly, most
candidates and officeholders downplayed the issue- out of fear of 'politi-
cizing' the event! Overall, Clinton's comments about Sister Souljah,
Ross Perot's reference to blacks as 'you people', and the controversy
over black singer Ice-T's song 'Cop Killer' received greater attention in
the campaign than the LA uprising and its social, economic and political
roots.
Thus, while the 1992 election may be evidence of a repudiation of
the more extreme elements of racial backlash, it does not appear to be
much more than this. Continuing recent trends, Clinton received· only
39 per cent of the white vote, while garnering 82 per cent of the black
vote. In this context, it seems likely that he will be able (or willing) to
mobilize the kind of sustained public support necessary to redress the
grievances of the last twelve years, let alone the last 350. '
Similarly mixed signals were sent by the Democrats regarding issues
of class. As the sign in his campaign headquarters - which read, 'the
economy, stupid' - made clear, Clinton won the 1992 presidential -
election by focusing on the longest and deepest recession in a decade.
When asked for the one or two issues that most influenced their choice
for president, 43 per cent of voters said the state of the economy, while
another 21 per cent said the deficit and 20 per cent said the high cost
of health care. No other issue was mentioned by over 15 per cent of the
voting public. And more than twice as many voters who mentioned the
economy and jobs voted for Clinton (53 per cent) as for Bush (24 per
cent) or Perot (23 per cent). The advantage for Clinton among those
who mentioned" health care (61.per cent, versus 19 per cent for Bush
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and 14 per cent for Perot) was even more dramatic. Perhaps most
significantly, Clinton won pluralities among most of those middle- and
working-class groups who, in recent years, had voted Republican.
But it would be a mistake to see this vote as a reconstruction of the
New Deal or Great Society coalitions. American voters have. always
'voted their pocketbooks', and a faltering economy can make the most
popular president look bad. To be sure George Bush suffered from what
appeared to be a lack of compassion and from the sense that he lacked
a domestic agenda. His inability to respond convincingly to a citizen's
question regarding how he had personally suffered from the recent
economic decline - asked during the second presidential debate - came
to symbolize these tragic flaws. Nonetheless, the 1992 Democrats were
no vanguard for the oppressed. While playing up his humble roots,
Clinton ran campaign ads that called welfare 'a second chance - not a
way of life'. While promising to tax the rich, he also promised to cut the
taxes of the 'middle class'. And the substance behind his call for
'structural change' was a plan to revitalize the nation's economic infra-
structure and to develop a corporate-government partnership modelled
on Japan. It is little wonder that a Fortune 500 executive remarked
shortly after the Democratic convention that 'big business has no trou-
ble with the idea of a Clinton presidency'. And as one participant in
Clinton's post-election 'economi~ summit' concluded, 'Liberals are going
to get projects. ConselVatives are going to get the economy.' A look at
Clinton's key cabinet appointments seems to bare this obseJ.Vation out:
the chairman of a large Wall Street brokerage house as his White House
economic adviser; a moderate Senator and business advocate as Treasury
Secretary; a congressional budget-cutter as head of OMB; and a Fortune
500 CEO as his chief of staff. Vice President AI Gore's dissolution of
his predecessor's 'Council on Economic Competitiveness' (a govern-
ment-business partnership aimed at further deregulating industry) is an
encouraging sign. Yet early indications are that cutting the federal deficit
will take precedence over stimulatingjobs. And while the appointmentof
Hillary Clinton to head the task force looking into "health care is
promising, most other indications are that reforms in health care will be
modest at best. George Bush may be remembered as the Herbert
Hoover of the 1990s, but there is, as of yet, little indication that Bill
Clinton will be the next FOR.
The elections of 1992 provide many reasons for optimism regarding
gender issues in the United States. The Republicans' attempts to shift
attention away from the economy by focusing on the decay of the tradi-
tional family backfired badly - Dan Quayle proved no match for Mwphy
Brown regarding the issue of single parenthood. Mobilized by the
Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill controversy, more women ran for public
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office in 1992 than ever before in US history. None of the three wo~en
running for governorships won, but 21 of the 34 female candidates for
other state-wide executive offices did, including all 4 who ran for ,state
attorney general, 4 of the 7 who ran for lieutenant governor, 3 of the 5
who ran for state treasurer, and 2 of the 5 who ran for secretary of state.
In addition, a record number of state legislative seats were won by women.
While these victories add only incrementally to women's totals, a little
more than 20 per cent of all state-wide elected offices and a little less than
20 per cent of all state legislative seats are now held by women. When the
147-member Washington State Legislature convened in 1993, nearly 40
per cent of the legislators were women - the highest percentage in the
country and the closest to the elusive 50 per cent mark ever achieved by a
state congress.
Women candidates fared well for national office as well. In the
Senate four of the eleven women candidates were elected, with Lynn
Yeakel losing a very close race to incumbent Arlen Specter, one of the
principal 'villains' in the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy. In the
process, several fIrsts were achieved. There will now be a record six
women in the Senate. As noted above, Carol Moseley Braun will be the
fltst Mrican-American woman elected to the Senate. And California will
be the first state in which both US Senators are women - Barbara Boxer
and Dianne Feinstein. Of the record 106 women running for the House,
47 of them won, including 24 non-incumbents. This brings the percent-
age of women in the new House to nearly 11 per cent - also a record.
Not swprisingly, 5 of 6 women Senators and 35 of the 47 Congress-
women are Democrats. All of the newly elected female members of
Congress also support abortion rights. Significantly, the new Senate
]udiciaty Committee now includes two women.
The presidential race also provided glimmers of hope regarding the
status of women. The election of Bill Clinton seems to assure that new
nominees to the Supreme Court will be supportive of the right to an
abortion. The executive 'gag' order preventing federallyfunded counsellors
from giving information regarding abortions has already been rescinded,
and President Clinton has signed additional executive orders decoupling
foreign aid from the issue of abortion and allowing the use of fetal tissue in
medical research. At this writing Clinton also seems committed to making
the 'abortionpill' RU486 available in the United States, to ending the kind
of sexual harassment in the military exemplifiedby the infamous 'Tailhook'
incident, and, in a different kind of gender issue, to ending the ban on
homosexuals in the militaty. And Hillaty Clinton - now Hillary Rodham
Clinton - promises to be a very different role model than Barbara Bush,
and will undoubtedly play a significant role in a variety of substantive
policy decisions.'
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Again, however, it would be a mistake to read too much into these
encouraging signs. With 6 per cent of the Senate, with 11 per cent of the
House, even with 20 per cent of state legislatures and eXecutive offices. it
is still underrepresentation. Electoral success also varies dramatically by
state - for example, only 4 per cent of Kentucky's 1993 state legislature
will be women. And only 3 of the 24 women who won a seat in the House
actually defeated incumbents. More significantly, the national campaign
was remarkablydevoid of gender issues. Issues of abortion, sexual harass-
ment, pay equity, childcare, while raised at meetings with individual groups
and leaders, were avoided in both the debates and in the media campaigns
of both parties. Only 13 per cent of voters selected abortion as one of the
most important reasons they voted as they did, and of these, 54 per cent
voted for George Bush. And despite the inability of the Republicans to
make 'family values' a campaign issue, 68 per cent of voters said they
thought government should promote traditional values rather than pro-
mote tolerance for non-traditional views. Finally, consider the generally
negative reaction to Hillary Clinton's remark that she was 'no Tammy
Wynette standing by her man', and her tongue-in-cheek suggestion that
she could have 'stayed home and baked cookies' rather than become a
lawyer and political activist. More to the point, consider the Democratic
Party's reaction to this flack - Ms Clinton was given a new, more feminine
hair style, given a less visible role. and entered a contest for the best
cookie recipe. Ironically, but significantly, at the 1992 conventions it was
Barbara Bush, not HillaryClinton, who gave a primetime address.
The new administration's approach to foreign policy is especially un-
clear. Bill Clinton initially opposed the use of military force in the Gulf. In
addition, as a studenthe was opposed to the VietnamWar and avoided the
draft. Admittedly, the details in both cases were complicated, and were not
unambiguous examples of taking the moral high ground. Nonetheless, they
offered the Democrats, in the context of the 1992 campaign, the opportu-
nity to rebut the Republican worldview which had dominated foreign
policy for the prior twelve years..To be sure, the fact that Americans
rejected George Bush's efforts to use Clinton's past against him is encour-
aging. But the Democrats' defence of the past was that these issues didn't
matter any more: the Cold War is over, the turmoil of the 1960s and early
1970s caused us all to do things that might not be justifiable, and so on. In
essence they conceded the historical record to the Republicans, and thus
the way in which VietnamWar, the Cold Wart the GulfWar, and so on are
used rhetoricallyand strategicallyin the future.
Certainlya Clinton administration promises to be less militaristic than
the past three have been, and the nature of the times helps assure that
defence spending will consume a smaller part of the national budget.
However, the Democrats failure to articulate a strong, new vision of the
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post-Cold War world during the campaign appears to have hurt ~em
already. By sending US troops to Somalia and ordering several bombing
raids of Iraq, George Bush may have done more to shape the, new
administration's foreign policy during the two and a half months between
the election and the inauguration than Clinton himself had. Having spent
the campaign either avoiding foreign policy iSsues or assuring the public
that he, too, can be tough, the new president seems destined to use
foreign policy as the test ofhis manhood.
In the end, the attempt by Republicans to paint Bill Clinton as just
another liberal Democrat failed in 1992, but it failed in part because Bill
Clinton is not a liberal. As one of the leading spokespersons for moving
the Democratic Party to a more centrist position, Clinton's nomination
and victory is testimony as much to the strength of the Republican
Party over the past twelve years as to the resurgence of the Democrats.
True, the extreme right-wing rhetoric of the Republican convention was
a miscalculation. But it, too, selVes to show how the range of discourse
in America has shifted rightward. Clearly the ideological gap between
Patrick Buchanan and Bill Clinton is a large one, but what of the gap
between George Bush and Bill Clinton? Between Bill Clinton and Jesse
Jackson? The measure of these ideological distances remains unclear.
This is not to that suggest all is lost for the left in America. A
significant portion of Clinton's braintmst has roots in the New Left
politics of the 1960s, and both Clinton and AI Gore have articulated
several issue stands that are consistent with that agenda. In addition,
Clinton's constant calls for change and his populist, occasionally ·com-
munalist rhetoric is open to interpretations that are more radical than
intended. But in the end, Clinton won by exploiting people's desires for
something different rather than by informing those desires. He is the
frrst president to emerge out of the 'sixties generation', but like. many
from that generation, he was more an obselVer than a participant - he
held the culture and politics of the day to his lips, but did not inh~le
them. How this clearly curious obselVer of that era will react to his new
found power is unclear. Perhaps it will be his chance to represent the
ideals he skirted but never·embraced. Or perhaps what we have seen is
what we will get - a politician skilled at the art of compromise, but who,
in theend, knows which way the wind blows.
One Step Forward, One Step Back?
The Limits of American Political Discourse
In his 1992 State of the Union address, as he had in his prior two,
and in his inaugural address in 1989, George Bush pressed his theme
of voluntarism, arguing that government is limited in what it can do
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to solve America's domestic problems. In a sense, it was the very act
of saying this that made it so. Twelve years of essentially unanswered
attacks on progressive government have fnmly established the notion
that, as Ronald Reagan proclaimed in his 1980 inaugural address,
'Government is not the solution to America's problems - Government
is the problem.'
The notion that 'government is the problem' is deeply rooted in
America's political tradition. 'At the heart of American politics', writes
James Marone, 'lies a dread and yearning. The dread is notorious.
Americans fear public power as a threat to liberty.' 'The yearning' to
which Marone alludes 'is an alternative faith in direct, communal
democracy'. However, even this 'democratic wish' is not an endorse-
ment of government. To the contrary, it is based on the notion that
'the people would, somehow, put aside their government and rule
themselves directly.40
The gains made by blacks, the working class, the poor and women
during the 1930s and the 1960s were achieved by coupling America's
yearning for democracy with the notion that government could be an
instrument of the people rather than an enemy of them. This is an
inherently unstable marriage in the context of America's liberal demo-
cratic traditions. Ronald Reagan - and to a lesser extent George Bush.-
were able to exploit this instability by making populist appeals that
resonated with the public's 'yearning' for self-rule, while also reawaken-
ing their 'dread' of government. But conselVative populism is no more
comfortable with liberal democracy than progressive populism, and thus
no more f1Ill1 a foundation upon which to build.
Mer nearly a decade of watching the world change in dramatic
ways, America's yearning for community re-emerged in 1992. Of
course, without an appropriate public language or a public sphere
designed to accommodate it, this yearning was expressed in odd,
unsatisfactory ways. Nonetheless, it could be seen in the remarkable
appeal of the multibillionaire populist Ross Perot. It could be seen in
the popularity of new media formats that were more sUbstantive than
usual (for example, Perot's half hour 'info-mercials') and that allowed
for more direct input from the public itself (for example, the 'talk
show' format used in the second presidential debate). It could be seen
in both Clinton's and Perot's constant calls for greater civic involve-
ment. And it could be seen in all three candidate's - including
twelve-year incumbent George Bush's - claims to 'being the 'candidate
of change'. To be sure the proximate cause of this restlessness was
the poor state of the economy, but to end the discussion there is to
miss the point.
And yet in some crucial ways that is exactly where· the Democrats
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did end the discussion in the 1992 campaign. By making vague
references to 'change', they raised the expectations of the American
public. But by failing to engage in an open dialogue about, the
direction of that change - about both its costs and its promise - they
have made it less likely that these expectations will be fulfilled. At
times Clinton came tantalizingly close to seeing this: his use of the
'town meeting' format during the campaign and his post-election
'economic summit' demonstrate his desire to create a public sphere.
And in his 1993 inaugural address, he attempted to re-establish the
connection between popular democracy and progressive government
with his promise to 'give this capitol back to the people to whom it
belongs' and to restore 'government [as] a place for what Franklin
Roosevelt called bold, persistent experimentation'. But for government
to be the instrument of bold, persistent, democratic and progressive
change, we must fust broaden public discourse not only beyond the
ideological parameters set during the past twelve years, but beyond
those set by the logic of liberal democracy.
Notes and References
1. These reforms were also tied into the language and traditions of
democratic action and community that exist at the margins of
American culture and politics. Such appeals have always been tenu-
ous, however, and have seldom been able to sustain mainstream
social movements. In addition, they often become blurred, blending
in with the more ftrmly established values of classical liberalism. See
Russell Hanson, The DeJnocratic IJnagination (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986); M.X. Delli Carpini, 'Vietnam, Ideology, and
Domestic Politics', in M. Shafer (ed.), The Legacy (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1990); and James A. Marone, The DeJnocratic Wish (NelV
York: Basic Books, 1990).
2. See Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Move-
Jnents (New York: Pantheon, 1977); Regulating The Poor (New York:
Random House, 1971); Benjamin Ginsburg, The Consequences of
Consent (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982); Thomas Ferguson,
Fall of the House of Morgan (forthcoming).
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in AJnerica (New, York: Anchor
books, 1969), p. 525.
4. Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986).
5. C. Whalen .and B. Whalen, The Longest Debate (Washington DC:
Seven Locks Books, 1989)..
270 AN AMERICAN HALF-C ENTURY
6. The statistics on race in America are drawn from ]. Schwartz,
AJnerica's Hidden Success (New York: Norton and Co., 1988); F.
Harris and R. Wilkins, Quite Riots (New York: Pantheon, 1988);
and Whalen and Whalen, The Longest Debate.
7. This 'economic' argument also points out the extent to which these
reforms were perceived as tangential: they were legitimate pursuits
only to the extent that they were relatively costless to the rest of
the population.
8. Voting statistics presented throughout this essay are drawn from G.
Pomper (ed.), The Election of 1984 (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House
Press, 1985); G. Pomper (ed.), The Election of 1988 (Chatham, N]:
Chatham House Press, 1989); and M. Nelson (ed.), The Election of
1988 (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989).
9. C. McWilliams, 'The Meaning of the Election', in G. Pomper, The
Election of 1988, p. 199.
10. See T. Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980).
11. Their logic was that women's rights were less controversial, and
that, as a majority of the population, an appeal to women's self-
interest (as opposed to blacks) could be politically beneficial. At the
same time, however, afraid that even this would appear too much
like bowing to 'special interests', the bill's sponsors limited the
legislation's effectiveness by severely restricting the amount of
money women could collect for damages.
12. For example, attendance at all-black colleges and universities is on
the rise, as are all-black dorms, fraternities, etc. on predominantly
white campuses. More recently, blacks at several predominantly
white high schools and colleges have opted for separate proms and
graduation ceremonies. And public speakers advocating black sepa-
ratism, such as Professor Leonard Jeffries and the Nation of Islam's
Mohammed Khalid, have become common at events sponsored by
black campus organizations.
13. The US National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The
Kerner Report (New York: Bantam Books, 1968).
14. Statistics are drawn from J. Schwartz, A,nerican's Hidden Success;
and K. Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor (New York: Random
House, 1990).
15. As quoted in 'Gray: Bush Shortchanges the "Nation's Poor', The
Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 April 1989.
16. For an interesting if anecdotalanalys'is of the role of popularculture in
creating and maintaining this upper-middle-class self image, see Ben-
jamin DeMott, The I,nperial Middle (NewYork: Morrow Press, 1991).
A CONSENSUAL MAJORITY 271
17. K. Phillips, The Politics ofRich and Poor, p. 212.
18. Efforts to confront these issues through increased taxation at the
state level, such as those attempted by Governor James Florio in
New Jersey or Governor Lowell Weicker in Connecticut, were met
with intense opposition, often by those who would, ironically, be
most likely to benefit from them. .
19. K. Phillips, The Politics ofRich and Poor, p. 212.
20. Historical facts about women and politics and the women's move-
ment are drawn from R. Darcy, S. Welch and J. Clark, Women,
Elections, and Representation (New York: Longman, 1987); and S.
Evans, Bom for Liberty (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
21. Statistical data concerning women in the workforce is drawn from
S. Evans, Bom for Liberty; and US Census Bureau, The Statistical
Abstract of the United States (Washington DC: Government Printing
Office, 1989).
22. S.. Evans, Bom for Liberty. p. 275.
23. Information concerning women and public policy is drawn from S.
Evans, Bom for Liberty, 1989; and J. Gelb· and M. Lief Palley,
WOlnen and Public Policies (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987).
24. Prior to the 1930s there were, of course, no systematic public
opinion polls, but there is no historical record to suggest that a
majority of citizens opposed any of the major uses of US troops
from the War for Independence to the First World War. While
support for the Civil War certainly waned in the North, Lincoln's
electoral victory in 1864, over challengers such as McClelland, who
advocated a peaceful solution to· the conflict, suggests that this
opposition, even at its peak, did not constitute a majority.
25. Based on Roper polls as reported in P. Braestrup, The Big Story
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); D. Hallin, The Uncen-
sored War; and Gallup polls as reported in B. Wattenberg, The Real
Alnerica (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1976).
26. M. X. Delli Carpini, 'Vietnam, Ideology, and Domestic Politics', in
M. Shafer, The Legacy (Boston: BeacortPress, 1990).
27. B. Taylor, 'The Vietnam War Movie', in The Legacy;M. Novelli,
'Hollywood and Vietnam: Images of Vietnam in Popular Film', in M.
Klein (ed.), The Vietnaln Era (London: Pluto Press, 1990).
28. There is growing if circumstantial evidence that the arms for hos-
tages deal may have been cut during the 1980 presidential cam-
paign. A growing number of fonner members of the Iranian govem-
ment and the Carter ad~istrationhave suggested that Reagan's
campaign staff, led by William Casey and aided by George Bush,
272 AN AMERICAN HALP-C ENTURY
agreed to provide arms to the Iranians if they agreed not to release
the hostages being held in the US embassy until after the election.
29. For an excellent exploration of the inequitable coverage of political
events in South America as compared to Eastern Europe, see L.
Weschler, The Media's One and Only Freedom StolY', Columbia
Journalism Review (April 1990), pp. 26-31.
30. M. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1989).
31. Indeed, only days before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, American diplo-
mats .made clear to the Iraqis that the US had no treaties with
Kuwait and felt no obligation to respond should Iraq use force.
32. The fact that women were less supportive of the war than men, that a
majority of blacks opposed the war, and that support generally de-
clined when Congressional Democrats raised doubts about the use of
force, all provide some evidence that the aggregate support for the
Gulf War masked some ambivalence. Further evidence for this is
found in a series of focus groups I conducted with Scott Keeter. In
these discussions, conducted just after the hostilities ended, people
initially expressed overwhelmingsupport for the war. But when asked
to talk about their views in greater depth, most aclmowledged they
were unconvinced the war was necessary, and they remained cynical as
to the real motives for the war. Most also aclmowledged that they
would have preferred a peaceful solution to the conflict and suspect
that such a solution might have been possible.
33. M. Hertsgaard, On Bended Kne~ (New York: Farrar Straus GirollXt
1988); J. MacArthur, Second Front (NewYork: Hill and Wang, 1992).
34. T. Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching.
35. D. Hallin, The Uncensored War.
36. J. Schwartz,America's Hidden Success.
37. W.O. Burnham, Democracy in the Making (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1986), Chapter 12.
38. Reagan's success benefited from the fact that suspicion of 'big
government' runs through populist rhetoric of both the left and the
right in America. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, New
Left proponents and their progeny advocated for greater decentrali-
zation of government decision-making. Jimmy Carter won office in
1970 in part by running as an outsider who would make govern-
ment more accessible and who would shrink the federal bureauc-
racy. The left's vision of a decentralized government is, of course,
very different to the right's in many ways. Not the least of these
differences would be a continued role for the federal government in
redistributive and regulatory policies.
A CONSENSUAL MAJORITY 273
39. A similar tension can be seen on college and university campus~s,
where vague commitments to racial, cultural and sexual diverSity
dominate, but where those attempting to integrate such diversity
into the curriculum are increasingly accused of 'brainwashing' stu-
dents into 'politically correct' (i.e. nonracist, nonsexist, nonethno-
centric and critical) thought.
40. J. Marone, The De,nocratic Wish, p. 1.
